4. Mind & Matter: Non-Human Persons

Welcome to Section 4 of "Culture, Body, and Mind", a course in the anthropology of body and mind.

Revision

In Section 1, we learned about the anthropological approach. In Sections 2 & 3, we applied that aspect of the anthropological approach which is known as 'reflexivity'. Specifically, in Section 2, we critically examined notions of self, including the Western idea of individual. Then, in Section 3, we looked at the foundational text which underlies contemporary Western ideas of body and mind; Descartes' meditations. In Section 4, we consider alternative ideas of body and mind.

Tylor's animism

E.B. Tylor

"Animism" is the belief in the existence of soul. Most people, following early anthropologist, Edward B Tylor, use the term animism to describe beliefs that rivers, streams, rocks, animals etc. have souls.  You can read more about this in my summary of a section from his Primitive Culture (1871). Tylor applied the term "animism" to describe what he perceived as 'primitive tribes'.

This raises problems for anthropologists. You might think the word "primitive" is not very "PC"--and indeed most anthropologists have problems with it for various reasons related to politics, racism etc. But even leaving that aside, we no longer find the word "primitive" useful in describing societies. The term "tribe" is used, but in very specific contexts (for example as a contrast to bands, chiefdoms, and civilizations).

Furthermore, as Tylor himself acknowledges, contemporary Westerners might be seen as animist. It seems to me that anyone (including, but certainly not limited to all pious Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, etc whom I have met) who believes they have a spirit or a soul would necessarily be animist, as defined by Tylor. Descartes, obviously, would be an animist, attributing spirit to humans and to God. But when Tylor was writing, many people believed that with 'march of progress', and the rise of science,  these irrational beliefs in spirit would become extinct in the West and then maybe the rest of the world. This is not a position that I, and indeed most anthropologists, hold.

Ojibwa territory

Essential reading: Ojibwa animism?

We now consider the work of Hallowell an anthropologist who studied among First Nations (American Indians) in, I think, the 1930s. His most famous work is an essay on the Ojibwa (aka Ojibwe). The Ojibwa a  First Nations people from the Great Lakes.  It is believed that they began migrating westwards (to the left in the above map) from eastern (right) Great Lakes area. Please read, and enjoy, "Ojibwa Ontology..."

Hallowell observes that, for the Ojibwa, certain animals, plants, rocks, streams, trees etc have a spirit. On one level we could say that the perspective of the Ojibwa, is thus called animism (the idea that objects can be animated with soul). At a deeper level, it is hard to see a clear distinction, as in Cartesian dualism, between subjects and objects. So that it's not as if objects as soul, but more that things like rocks and bear might not be objects at all. Rather, for the Ojibwa is a big category of persons: and we belong below this category, having equal status with other animals and rocks. Put simply, two kinds of person exist: human and non-human. Instead of the dualism Descartes perceived in the universe, for the Ojibwa there is a oneness. What concept might we draw on to explain this difference?

Ojibwa family

Ojibwa ontology

If you find reading the original Hallowell difficult, you could also look at my summary In my summary I focus on the concept of ontology:

The word "ontology" means "your theory on what exists". So, if you believe in aliens and ghosts, then aliens and ghosts are part of your ontology. Descartes, a Western philosopher said that there was only mind and matter in the universe. Thus, his ontology held that there is only two radically distinct things, also known as "subject" (mind) and "object" (matter). And for a long while many Westerners adopted this ontology. Ojibwa ontology includes that persons take human and non-human form. This contradicts  Descartes' distinction of subject and object. It also means that humans, animals, trees, rocks, etc. are merely a sub-category of the larger category of persons 

Ojibwa family

Analyzing Ojibwa world-view

If we take a non-anthropological Western perspective we could say "oh Ojibwa have got it wrong. They don't understand that plants don't have souls". Or more likely, "wow the Ojibwa are so spiritual, they believe that a plant has soul!". By contrast, from the anthropological perspective, we say: "Let's say they've got it right. What would that mean?" 

Summary

By considering Aboriginal (Indigenous) Australians (Sections 2 & 3), and the Ojibwa (Section 4) we have been exposed to different conceptions of self, body, and mind. This could encourage reflection and introspection for us anthropologists. Even Western philosophers cannot agree on Western ideas of body and mind so it would seem incumbent upon us, if only as anthropologists, to seriously consider the possibility that we are not who or what we think we are. So what's the take-away point? Basically: Anthropology has shown that the idea of what constitutes self varies between culture. We can get this from such accounts as:

• Stanner on The Dreaming; 
• Tylor's on animism;  and, 
• Hallowell's on Ojibwe ontology,

all demonstrate that Descartes' theory is a culturally specific understanding of personhood. In a similar way, "Another way the cultural specificity of Cartesian Dualism shows up is with regard to "The Dreaming"

Speaking frankly, when I reflect on the materials we've covered in Sections 1-4, my own ideas about body and mind start to seem a little strange and those of the Ojibwa and other cultural groups seem more familiar. Indeed, this is a common experience for anthropologists. We find that studying anthropology makes the familiar strange and the strange familiar.