Revision
We started this course (Section 1) learning about the anthropological approach and especially its emphasis on reflexivity. We developed this reflexivity by studying typical Western beliefs regarding the self and the individual (Section 2) as well as regarding mind and body (Section 3). Typical Western beliefs center around the notion that thinking-things and/or non-thinking-things exist. To develop our understanding, we studied the dualism of Western philosopher, Descartes. We immediately contrasted Cartesian dualism with an Aboriginal Australian vision of 'one-ness' in the universe, as described by Stanner. In Section 4, the aim was to develop a deeper appreciation of alternative views of body and mind by looking at Ojibwa culture.Solution to Descartes' problem?
In this section, we away from the philosophy that we experience the material world with our mind. The new idea is that we are things in the world with bodies that experience the world.
The 'phenomenological' (for want of a better word) theories of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty provide an alternative to Cartesian dualism. According to these theories, you are a self or body existing in the word. This must be the starting point for any philosophy. The radical doubts regarding the existence of the physical world and body can thus be dispelled.
Maybe, in philosophical terms, the embodiment theories just 'beg the question'; they don't really answer Descartes' problem. Regardless, as we will see in Section 5, the theories of phenomenology (and within them the concept of "embodiment") have proven very useful for anthropologists to analyze cultures with.
The 'phenomenological' (for want of a better word) theories of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty provide an alternative to Cartesian dualism. According to these theories, you are a self or body existing in the word. This must be the starting point for any philosophy. The radical doubts regarding the existence of the physical world and body can thus be dispelled.
Maybe, in philosophical terms, the embodiment theories just 'beg the question'; they don't really answer Descartes' problem. Regardless, as we will see in Section 5, the theories of phenomenology (and within them the concept of "embodiment") have proven very useful for anthropologists to analyze cultures with.
Phenomenology in Philosophy
This section must be read with a huge caveat in mind. I have only an undergrad understanding of philosophy. And now I only read this philosophy as an anthropologist seeking a better understanding of culture, which was not the goal of any of the major philosophers of phenomenology. That said, you could start by reading my presentation notes on phenomenology, or just go ahead and read the rest of this blog.
Small "p" phenomenology
The concept of "phenomenology" goes back at least the Enlightenment. Different philosophers tend to use the concept in different ways. Famously, Kant distinguished between phenomenon and noumenon. The moon, trees, doors, carpet are all both a phenomena and a noumena. The moon as a phenomenon is the moon as we perceive it shining (or shadowy) in the sky. A moon as a noumenon is the moon in itself, which lies behind appearances, and can never be perceived. (Kant is NOT proposing a scientific idea that there is a solid object which reflects light. Rather for Kant, the solid object of the moon and the light it reflects are both phenomena, not noumena.) [NH: don't take my word on Kant. I'm relying on memory and the last time I studied him was 1995! Please double-check for yourself] . This concept of "phenomenology" is usually spelled with a small "p".
But the "Phenomenology" (capital "P") that anthropologists are interested is a 'school' of philosophy. Like "Logical Positivism", "Existentialism", in begins in the late 1800s. Anthropologists have skipped the early figures of Phenomenology--including Hegel. Rather, anthropologists tend to start with Husserl.
Husserl
Phenomenology & Husserl
Husserl consciously side-stepped the skepticism (or solipsism) about the outside world which was bequeathed to us in Descartes' philosophy. He was more interested in investigating our direct experience as I try to describe in my summary of "Lecture 1" in "The Idea of Phenomenology".
But remember, I am not talking about what my right elbow really is. I don't even assume that I have a right elbow. Maybe it's all in my imagination.
Rather what I am doing is a 'descriptive science of consciousness'. I'm describing my mental state of awareness of my elbow, regardless of whether my elbow exists as matter or is real in other ways.
I can do the same for a bedroom fan that is blowing air in my living room. My feet, which are closest to it feel cooler. I feel comforted by the whirring sound as it swings from left to right etc. I keep doing this Epoque for other objects I observe.
And if I'm talented enough at Epoque, I may be able to make some great findings about elbows, fans, and experience in general. I would then be able to contribute the 'science of phenomenology'--a detailed description of consciousness--that Husserl envisioned, but which never really took off.
Husserl & 'Bracketing off' (Epoque)
Husserl thought he had found a way out the impasse created by Descartes. This was to investigate direct experience by bracketing off. Husserl called this process "Epoque". Here is my example of bracketing off, as I understand it:Leave aside the question of whether your right elbow is real. Now observe your right elbow. Move it a large circle. Notice that while connected 'properly' to your body, your elbow extends only to a certain extent. Observe that you can bring a side of your elbow close to your face, that you cannot place in your right underarm but you can make it touch your left knee. Notice that trying to directly perceive the point of the elbow requires manipulating the arm. Does it feel uncomfortable and frustrating doing this? If not how exactly does it feel? Try to focus deeply on this. Now notice that you can point your right elbow up and down and to the right. It's impossible to make it point towards your shoulder.
You might now feel more acquainted with your right elbow than your other elbow. This gives me a sensation of having a body of two 'sides' right and left. Maybe I could go on from there. But I don't need to assume that I actually have an elbow to do this exercise. What I do have is the experience of my elbow and I can pay extremely careful attention to this. Maybe by doing this, I can understand this phenomenon; my right elbow.
But remember, I am not talking about what my right elbow really is. I don't even assume that I have a right elbow. Maybe it's all in my imagination.
Rather what I am doing is a 'descriptive science of consciousness'. I'm describing my mental state of awareness of my elbow, regardless of whether my elbow exists as matter or is real in other ways.
I can do the same for a bedroom fan that is blowing air in my living room. My feet, which are closest to it feel cooler. I feel comforted by the whirring sound as it swings from left to right etc. I keep doing this Epoque for other objects I observe.
And if I'm talented enough at Epoque, I may be able to make some great findings about elbows, fans, and experience in general. I would then be able to contribute the 'science of phenomenology'--a detailed description of consciousness--that Husserl envisioned, but which never really took off.
Bracketing off vs Mindfulness
This process of bracketing off reminds me of one kind 'mindfulness' practices in meditation, whereby you focus on for example the feeling of your feet touching the floor, the feeling of anger in your chest etc.. In the kinds of meditation I've been exposed to in the West, the goal is, I guess, presence, acceptance, and inner peace. But for Husserl the goal is knowledge."To the things themselves"?
Famously, Husserl wanted to take philosophy "back to the "things themselves"". But to my way of thinking, this is a misleading statement. It seems to imply that there are objects existing outside our mind and that we should attend to those objects. As I understand, Husserl wants us to focus on experience and forget about whether the objects are real independently of our existence.Summary
What Husserl provides for me is, potentially:- An answer to Cartesian doubts about the existence of the outside world;
- A new attitude towards knowledge being based on experience alone; and thus,
- A reason to focus deeply on experience.
Application
As anthropologists, we can extend Husserl's 'bracketing off' and use it for our own purposes. Take the right elbow described above. A Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu (BJJ) practitioner experiences her elbow as something to protect from 'traps'; whereas a karate practitioner experiences her elbow as 'weapon' for an elbow strike attack (enpi). A cellist is aware (unconsciously!) of the position of his right elbow in relation to the strings and his body. So different social positions (cellist, BJJ or Karate practitioner) could lead to different experiences of the world and the place of self in it.
Now let's take it even further. As a teenager, I played drinking games with friends. Pointing with the index finger was always 'punished' with a 'drink'; therefore my friends and I became accustomed to pointing with the elbow; so accustomed, in fact, that we began pointing with our elbow even when we weren't playing drinking games. So a subculture--teenage male drinking 'societies'--develops its own awareness of the world.
The next move could be to the class level. Now, as a parent, I no longer engage in drinking games. Rather, I would encourage you to think of me as a thoroughly, righteous and upstanding member of the community. (Just kidding!) Anyway, I encourage my children not to rest their arms on the table when they eat. That's my middle-class upbringing shining through!
Finally, we can move to a cultural level. In Korea, if we can believe what I've heard, there is another experience of the right elbow. If you are pouring a drink for someone and wish to show respect, you can pour with your right hand and rest your right elbow lightly in your left palm.
Now following from Husserl, within a society we expect that the experience of the body is contingent on sociological factors such as class, age, even sports and hobbies. The experience is heightened when comparing cultures. The experience of the body therefore gives us great insight into cultures. This insight is not just cultures as sets of beliefs (e.g. the Ojibwe believed that bears are their grandfathers) but cultures as sets of experiences.
Now let's take it even further. As a teenager, I played drinking games with friends. Pointing with the index finger was always 'punished' with a 'drink'; therefore my friends and I became accustomed to pointing with the elbow; so accustomed, in fact, that we began pointing with our elbow even when we weren't playing drinking games. So a subculture--teenage male drinking 'societies'--develops its own awareness of the world.
The next move could be to the class level. Now, as a parent, I no longer engage in drinking games. Rather, I would encourage you to think of me as a thoroughly, righteous and upstanding member of the community. (Just kidding!) Anyway, I encourage my children not to rest their arms on the table when they eat. That's my middle-class upbringing shining through!
Korean drinking etiquette |
Finally, we can move to a cultural level. In Korea, if we can believe what I've heard, there is another experience of the right elbow. If you are pouring a drink for someone and wish to show respect, you can pour with your right hand and rest your right elbow lightly in your left palm.
Now following from Husserl, within a society we expect that the experience of the body is contingent on sociological factors such as class, age, even sports and hobbies. The experience is heightened when comparing cultures. The experience of the body therefore gives us great insight into cultures. This insight is not just cultures as sets of beliefs (e.g. the Ojibwe believed that bears are their grandfathers) but cultures as sets of experiences.
Heidegger
Heidegger vs Husserl
Eclipsing Husserl in influence is Heidegger. Poor old Husserl is so easily overlooked, famous philosophy Professor Dreyfus said, in an unguarded moment, about phenomenology "Heidegger's the source...it all comes from him". Heidegger studied under Husserl, but he came to increasingly disavow his Jewish teacher. This seems to have occurred after Heidegger became a Nazi, something for which he never apologized or even seemed to regret! Regardless, some people place Heidegger, along with Wittgenstein, as the two greatest philosophers of the 20th Century.
Heidegger refuses to split the world into thinking things and matter (i.e. subject and object). Rather, according to Heidegger, I am "da-sein" a being in the world. "Da-sein" is Heidegger's name for the self. The self is being along with other kinds of beings (headphones, remote controls, clouds, corn plants). )But da-sein is unique in that it knows about, cares about, and purposefully interacts with its fellow beings (I put headphones on my head, replace the batteries on my remote control, worry whether the cloud will bring rain, harvest my corn plant).
For more on Heidegger, you could start with my summary of Heidegger's "Being-in-the-world".
Heidegger & Being-in-the-world
What Heidegger provides for me is a completely new way to understand my self. Before I read Heidegger I thought I was either (i) ethereal soul or spirit somehow trapped or connected to a physical body, or (ii) just a bunch of synapses and neurons, and entirely material entity. According to Heidegger, I am neither (i) nor (ii).Heidegger refuses to split the world into thinking things and matter (i.e. subject and object). Rather, according to Heidegger, I am "da-sein" a being in the world. "Da-sein" is Heidegger's name for the self. The self is being along with other kinds of beings (headphones, remote controls, clouds, corn plants). )But da-sein is unique in that it knows about, cares about, and purposefully interacts with its fellow beings (I put headphones on my head, replace the batteries on my remote control, worry whether the cloud will bring rain, harvest my corn plant).
For more on Heidegger, you could start with my summary of Heidegger's "Being-in-the-world".
Merleau-Ponty
Merleau-Ponty & Embodiment
Merleau-Ponty's most important work was published in the 1940s. He was a French philosopher who put the final piece of the jigsaw together, for anthropologists at least. Husserl turned us on to experience; Heidegger places us in the world with other things. But where Heidegger seems largely to have overlooked to the body in the world, Merleau-Ponty stressed the role of the entire body interacting the world. In other words, Heidegger neglected the body; he treated the self ('da sein') as something like a head (replete with eyes, ears, taste buds etc.) interacting in the world.
Merleau-Ponty drew on Husserl and Heidegger, but his idea was that perception is only possible if we take for granted that we possess a body in the world. So his philosophy starts with a body in the world, rather than (as with Descartes) a thought. Merleau-Ponty makes us aware that this body is replete with arms, legs, and adopts different positions (such as squatting, walking, riding a skateboard). Perception is always embodied, you cannot perceive without being a body in space. The form of your body (as a baby or an elderly person) and the position it takes (riding a motorbike or pushing a shopping trolley) constitutes your experience.
According to Merleau-Ponty the experience of walking on stilts, compared to walking or riding a bike, would provide these 'Burning Man' revelers with a unique perspective of the world |
To have senses is to have a body in space. That is what our subjectivity consists in. What it is to be you is to be a body in space. All your most precious experiences and also your most mundane actions and movements define who you are. But they all come through your having a body in space. This implies that changing your body (e.g. if you acquire a physical disability or a new physical ability) changes your perspective and changes who you are.
Reading Merleau-Ponty
For anthropology students who wish to develop an advanced understanding of phenomenology, of all three philosophers, I would suggest concentrating Merleau-Ponty. This is only because I think Merleau-Ponty has been more influential for anthropology. When it comes to studying, I usually think it is best to read the original author of an idea, rather than someone else explaining them. However, unluckily for us, Merleau-Ponty is très difficile to read. So we will read another philosopher Charles Taylor explaining Merleau-Ponty. Taylor is easier than Merleau-Ponty but is still challenging. So, take a big breath and read Taylor's "Embodied Agency". If you find it too much, my summary of Taylor might help.Parkour enthusiasts experience, the stairs, concrete, bollards differently to a skateboarder. |
Philosophy and anthropology
And now a disclaimer. It feels strange to use so much Western philosophy in an anthropology course. Yet anthropologists have drawn much inspiration from philosophy in the study of body and mind. Maybe this is partly because questions of body and mind have troubled philosophers for generations, whereas body and mind has only emerged as a focus in anthropology since the 1980s. In any case, we anthropologists need a basic grasp of this philosophy, as it provides a theoretical basis for understanding body and mind in other cultures.Required Reading: Kalpana Ram & Phantom Limbs
Now it's time to turn to an anthropological application of these ideas. Ram draws on the ideas of phenomenology to describe the experience of first Indian generation migrants in Australia's capital, Canberra. They often live in a time-warp and create essentialized or reified versions of their ‘culture’ for their children. How is this embodied? You can read for yourself in:
Ram, K 2005, "Phantom limbs: South Indian dance and immigrant reifications of the female body", Journal of Intercultural Studies, v. 26, no. 1-2, pp. 121-137.
In the reading, Ram describes the phenomenon of the 'phantom limb'. Philosophers have long pondered the question of the 'phantom limb'. Just say your arms and legs were amputated. After the surgery, your arms felt itchy and your legs felt painful. The 'phantom limb' refers to the frequently painful sensation that a missing arm or leg is still attached to the body. It can occur in two situations; when a person was born without the limb, or when the limb was lost in an accident, amputation and so on. The 'phantom limb' troubles philosophers because it suggests that sensory data cannot be trusted. Ram, however, takes a different approach to the 'phantom limb'. She shows how it can be an analogy for the bodily experience of migration in two ways:
Put simply, with phantoms limbs you feel that something which is there is real. Similarly, Indian migrants feel like something that isn't there is real. And this imagined (or ‘phantom’) culture becomes embodied.
In the reading, Ram describes the phenomenon of the 'phantom limb'. Philosophers have long pondered the question of the 'phantom limb'. Just say your arms and legs were amputated. After the surgery, your arms felt itchy and your legs felt painful. The 'phantom limb' refers to the frequently painful sensation that a missing arm or leg is still attached to the body. It can occur in two situations; when a person was born without the limb, or when the limb was lost in an accident, amputation and so on. The 'phantom limb' troubles philosophers because it suggests that sensory data cannot be trusted. Ram, however, takes a different approach to the 'phantom limb'. She shows how it can be an analogy for the bodily experience of migration in two ways:
- The phantom limb retains the position of the real limb at the time of injury—“the frozen quality of the “Indianness” that immigrants practice overseas” (e.g. they left India during the 1970s so Indians still wear flares in their imagination)
- Phantom limb is created “in subjects who hitherto had none” in response to some circumstance or emotion—migration in colonial and post-colonial settings (e.g. they imagine a historical India that never existed)
Put simply, with phantoms limbs you feel that something which is there is real. Similarly, Indian migrants feel like something that isn't there is real. And this imagined (or ‘phantom’) culture becomes embodied.
Baseball Embodiment
Baseball players have a special way of moving.
Baseballers have unique ways of conducting their body. In this clip,
watch how, among many other things, the umpire signals "3" with his middle,
ring, and pinkie finger.
watch how, among many other things, the umpire signals "3" with his middle,
ring, and pinkie finger.
Summary
Only a minority of anthropologists explicitly attempt to do phenomenological anthropology. Nevertheless, the concepts of "embodiment" and "lived experience" have come mainstays in contemporary anthropology. So, in Section 6, we will delve further into anthropological accounts of lived experience and embodiment.
KALPANA RAM QUESTIONS:
ReplyDeleteWhat is a phantom limb? Why is the experience of migration like having phantom limb? What effects do these constructions have on women’s lives and bodies?
MERLEAU-PONTY QUESTIONS
ReplyDeleteHow is Merleau-Ponty’s vision different from Descartes’? Why is the “embodiment” concept significant for philosophy? What is the opposite of “embodiment”? How do anthropologists use the idea of embodiment?
Tilley writes:
“we do not live in an environment. Such a position immediately posits our
separation. Rather we have an environment, we are part of it and it is a part of
us...we are...immersed” (Tilley 1999:322).
How is this relevant to Descartes and Merleau-Ponty? How would Merleau-Ponty’s account of wax differ from Descartes’? Do we have bodies like we have a shirt? Why / why not?
As a philosophy undergrad I learned how other philosophers had presented different challenges to Descartes. For instance, in response to Descartes' idea that knowledge primarily from reason, the empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) said knowledge primarily comes from experience. In response to Descartes' method of radical doubt, Wittgenstein wrote, ""If you tried to doubt everything, you wouldn't get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty." I won't consider those other philosophers here because anthropologists of body and mind have drawn most deeply on phenomenology.
ReplyDeleteIt's not that we see the world with our eyes. Rather, Merleau-Ponty argues that we experience the world with our body. Now for anthropologists, we see body as culturally constructed. Bodies are different in different cultures. So anthropologists think people from different cultures experience the world differently through different cultural bodies.
ReplyDeleteIf you are reading Kalpana Ram, remember the 'phantom limbs' idea is not Merleau-Ponty's big contribution to philosophy. Rather, the problems of 'phantom limbs' have long vexed philosophers. In fact, Merleau-Ponty's main contribution can be expressed in one word; embodiment.
ReplyDeleteMerleau-Ponty's philosophy starts with the fact that we are a body in space. This body provides us with perception and then we have knowledge. This contrasts the empiricists like Locke and Hume who started with perception and then moved to knowledge. They did not emphasise (either in ignorance or as a conscious choice) the role of the body
ReplyDeleteFor Merleau-Ponty and the anthropologists he has influenced, experience comes from our body being in space. This can be a stationary body (Balinese sleep with their head directed towards the 'mountain' and their feet towards the sea; Japanese sit kneeling) and also a moving body (a 'traditional' Javanese men should never run; he should but only walk; and if he's with his wife, the wife should walk behind him). These stationary and moving bodies produce unique orientations and experiences of the world. And these stationary and moving bodies are created, to a certain extent, by culture.
ReplyDeleteIn "Worlds of Sense and Sensing the World" famous anthropologist Tim Ingold argues that his interpretation of Merleau-Ponty has been misunderstood. It's an informative read if you're interested in the way anthropologists use Merleau-Ponty:
ReplyDeletehttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1DI9UXRX2uM5asmlLbM1N6etmpOjTaV0T/view?usp=sharing