9. Controlling bodies & minds (i): Bodies, minds, & discipline

Welcome to Section 9 of "Culture, Body & Mind". A course in the Anthropology of Body & Mind at La Trobe University.

Revision: Embodiment & Habitus

In Sections 5-7, we studied the idea that bodies are socially and culturally formed. In Sections 5 & 6 we considered the anthropological take on phenomenology. The argument holds that culture shapes your body. You experience the world through your body. Anthropologists must thus focus on the body and lived experience in order to understand society and culture. Section 7 was concerned with another theory of body. Bourdieu's idea of 'habitus' is particularly useful in explaining different bodies within stratified society. 

From punishing the body to disciplining the mind 

Now we change tack entirely. Foucault assumes that the body-mind distinction is useful (the question simply doesn't arise in the Foucault I've read). Foucault sees modernity as a transition from punishing bodies to disciplining minds. In Western history, the demise of spectacle and torture coincided with the rise of control. Arbitrarily, a Medieval king could command “Off with his head!”, but he could not control the population. With the onset of the Modern period, the ruler could not openly and arbitrarily execute a ‘citizen’, but, paradoxically, had higher levels of control over the population. How do we explain this paradox? What is the ‘underbelly’ of democracy, constitution, and laws which protect citizens?

Required reading

Are you ready to begin what might be the most difficult and rewarding reading of your life so far? Read “Panopticism” pp. 195- in  Foucault, M 1991, Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Here is an HTML version.

Or you can read this abridged version instead.

Comprehension Questions

Why, according to Foucault, do we keep tabs on ourselves in a disciplinary society? Why does Foucault refer to his book Discipline and Punish as “ ‘political economy’ of the body”, “a history of the modern soul on trial”? According to Foucault, rather than just recording and observing, the new techniques of actually constitute a new kind of political subject: the individual citizen. How does this happen?  What is the difference between Foucault’s vision of society and Orwell’s vision of Big Brother? OK if you've comprehended the ideas, it's time to see if you can apply and evaluate them.

Evaluating Foucault's theory

Having discussed how we might apply Foucault's theory, we should now turn to evaluating the idea. Obviously, we don't yet live in an era of complete governmentality. For example, according to Foucault, in the past, punishment and discipline were directed towards the body. In the modern era (c. 1600), it is directed towards the soul/mind. But in Australia, we still have police and courts. In America, incarceration rates seem to be on the rise. other words, in a modern society, there is still a threat of bodily punishment. But, in defense of Foucault's theory:

1. The treatment of prisoners etc. is mostly directed towards their souls and minds. Reforming their minds is the new goal.
2. Even with the rise in modern rates of incarceration, we can see that governmentality is not complete. It is still failing to operate completely. 

With complete governmentality, we won’t need police, courts, prisons, or outside surveillance. It would not be like 1984/Brave New World/Big Brother. We will all control ourselves, if Foucault is correct.

Critiquing Foucault: The Art of Not Being Governed

Famous anthropologist James Scott (2009) highlights the opposite effect. Instead of Foucault's Art of Government Scott has developed a concept which he calls the ‘art-of-not-being-governed’. He says you can find this 'art' being practiced in "Zomia".

The Zomia area. This is where, Scott believes, anarchists effectively
practice The Art of Not Being Governed

Zomia is a recently made-up term to cover an area around the southern area of China.  As my co-author, Winarnita, and I explain in our article "Seeking the State", the art of not being governed refers to:

how people work to avoid state rule. ...In Scott’s (2009) ethnographic example, different ethnicities have sought refuge in the hills and mountains of mainland Southeast Asia, eastern India and Southern China—an area called ‘Zomia’. Zomia consists in:
      virtually all the lands at altitudes above roughly three hundred meters all the way
      from the Central Highlands of Vietnam to northeastern India and traversing five
      Southeast Asian nations (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma) and
     four provinces of China (Yunan, Guizhou, Guangxi, and parts of Sichuan
      (2009: ix).
To avoid the state taxes and control associated with sedentary agriculture in the lowland areas of Southeast Asia, these upland people have turned to swidden cultivating and
hunter-gathering. These ‘anarchists’, as Scott styles them, number in the millions.

Woman in the hilly country that characterizes Zomia, far from Asia's urban centers.
She is presumably one of Scott's anarchists

So Scott presents us with an account that is quite at odds with Foucault's Art of Government.

Critiquing Foucault: Seeking the State

My own opinion is that people, in fact, try to emulate the state. They do this by their own will, not because of a panoptic scheme or a govern-mentality. In the article, "Seeking the State", my co-author Winarnita and I argued that in marginal areas of Southeast Asia, neither extreme of the Art of Government nor the Art-of-Not-Being-Governed seems to apply. Rather people seek out the state and adopt its practices and wealth in their everyday life. OK, that's enough of a digression.

Summary

Returning to the main theme of this course: body and mind. Foucault says, in really simple terms, that in the modern period we have moved from punishing the body to disciplining the mind. This is a self-imposed discipline; we all have an internal prison guard in our mind. We soon won't need prisons or even police as we all become disciplined, docile subjects. This is the new, modern subjectivity. We will now move on to Section 9 and another theory of how control is exerted; by depriving people of citizenship. 

Further Research

For more materials on Foucault see my blog "Governmentality: Care & Control".

5. Phenomenology & Embodiment: Your Body, Your Self, Your World

Welcome to Section 5 of "Culture, Body, and Mind".

Revision

We started this course (Section 1) learning about the anthropological approach and especially its emphasis on reflexivity. We developed this reflexivity by studying typical Western beliefs regarding the self and the individual (Section 2) as well as regarding mind and body (Section 3). Typical Western beliefs center around the notion that thinking-things and/or non-thinking-things exist. To develop our understanding, we studied the dualism of Western philosopher, Descartes. We immediately contrasted Cartesian dualism with an Aboriginal Australian vision of 'one-ness' in the universe, as described by Stanner. In Section 4, the aim was to develop a deeper appreciation of alternative views of body and mind by looking at Ojibwa culture.

Solution to Descartes' problem?

In this section, we away from the philosophy that we experience the material world with our mind. The new idea is that we are things in the world with bodies that experience the world.

The 'phenomenological' (for want of a better word) theories of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty provide an alternative to Cartesian dualism. According to these theories, you are a self or body existing in the word. This must be the starting point for any philosophy. The radical doubts regarding the existence of the physical world and body can thus be dispelled.

Maybe, in philosophical terms, the embodiment theories just 'beg the question'; they don't really answer Descartes' problem. Regardless, as we will see in Section 5, the theories of phenomenology (and within them the concept of "embodiment") have proven very useful for anthropologists to analyze cultures with.

Phenomenology in Philosophy

This section must be read with a huge caveat in mind. I have only an undergrad understanding of philosophy. And now I only read this philosophy as an anthropologist seeking a better understanding of culture, which was not the goal of any of the major philosophers of phenomenology. That said, you could start by reading my presentation notes on phenomenology, or just go ahead and read the rest of this blog.

Small "p" phenomenology

The concept of "phenomenology" goes back at least the Enlightenment. Different philosophers tend to use the concept in different ways. Famously, Kant distinguished between phenomenon and noumenon. The moon, trees, doors, carpet are all both a phenomena and a noumena. The moon as a phenomenon is the moon as we perceive it shining (or shadowy) in the sky. A moon as a noumenon is the moon in itself, which lies behind appearances, and can never be perceived. (Kant is NOT proposing a scientific idea that there is a solid object which reflects light. Rather for Kant, the solid object of the moon and the light it reflects are both phenomena, not noumena.) [NH: don't take my word on Kant. I'm relying on memory and the last time I studied him was 1995! Please double-check for yourself] . This concept of "phenomenology" is usually spelled with a small "p". 

But the "Phenomenology" (capital "P") that anthropologists are interested is a 'school' of philosophy. Like "Logical Positivism", "Existentialism", in begins in the late 1800s. Anthropologists have skipped the early figures of Phenomenology--including Hegel. Rather, anthropologists tend to start with Husserl. 

Husserl

Phenomenology & Husserl 

Husserl consciously side-stepped the skepticism (or solipsism) about the outside world which was bequeathed to us in Descartes' philosophy. He was more interested in investigating our direct experience as I try to describe in my summary of "Lecture 1" in "The Idea of Phenomenology".

Husserl & 'Bracketing off' (Epoche)

Husserl thought he had found a way out the impasse created by Descartes. This was to investigate direct experience by bracketing off.  Husserl called this process "Epoche". Here is my example of bracketing off, as I understand it:

Leave aside the question of whether your right elbow is real. Now observe your right elbow. Move it a large circle. Notice that while connected 'properly' to your body, your elbow extends only to a certain extent.  Observe that you can bring a side of your elbow close to your face, that you cannot place in your right underarm but you can make it touch your left knee. Notice that trying to directly perceive the point of the elbow requires manipulating the arm. Does it feel uncomfortable and frustrating doing this? If not how exactly does it feel? Try to focus deeply on this. Now notice that you can point your right elbow up and down and to the right. It's impossible to make it point towards your shoulder.

You might now feel more acquainted with your right elbow than your other elbow. This gives me a sensation of having a body of two 'sides' right and left. Maybe I could go on from there. But I don't need to assume that I actually have an elbow to do this exercise. What I do have is the experience of my elbow and I can pay extremely careful attention to this. Maybe by doing this, I can understand this phenomenon; my right elbow.

But remember, I am not talking about what my right elbow really is. I don't even assume that I have a right elbow. Maybe it's all in my imagination.

Rather what I am doing is a 'descriptive science of consciousness'. I'm describing my mental state of awareness of my elbow, regardless of whether my elbow exists as matter or is real in other ways.

I can do the same for a bedroom fan that is blowing air in my living room. My feet, which are closest to it feel cooler. I feel comforted by the whirring sound as it swings from left to right etc. I keep doing this Epoque for other objects I observe.

And if I'm talented enough at Epoque, I may be able to make some great findings about elbows, fans, and experience in general. I would then be able to contribute the 'science of phenomenology'--a detailed description of consciousness--that Husserl envisioned, but which never really took off.

Bracketing off vs Mindfulness

This process of bracketing off reminds me of one kind 'mindfulness' practices in meditation, whereby you focus on for example the feeling of your feet touching the floor, the feeling of anger in your chest etc.. In the kinds of meditation I've been exposed to in the West, the goal is, I guess, presence, acceptance, and inner peace. But for Husserl the goal is knowledge.

"To the things themselves"?

Famously, Husserl wanted to take philosophy "back to the "things themselves"". But to my way of thinking, this is a misleading statement. It seems to imply that there are objects existing outside our mind and that we should attend to those objects. As I understand, Husserl wants us to focus on experience and forget about whether the objects are real independently of our existence.

Summary

What Husserl provides for me is, potentially:

1.  An answer to Cartesian doubts about the existence of the outside world;
2.  A new attitude towards knowledge being based on experience alone; and thus,
3. A reason to focus deeply on experience.

Application

As anthropologists, we can extend Husserl's 'bracketing off' and use it for our own purposes. Take the right elbow described above. A Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu (BJJ) practitioner experiences her elbow as something to protect from 'traps'; whereas a karate practitioner experiences her elbow as 'weapon' for an elbow strike attack (enpi). A cellist is aware (unconsciously!) of the position of his right elbow in relation to the strings and his body. So different social positions (cellist, BJJ or Karate practitioner) could lead to different experiences of the world and the place of self in it.

Now let's take it even further. As a teenager, I played drinking games with friends. Pointing with the index finger was always 'punished' with a 'drink'; therefore my friends and I became accustomed to pointing with the elbow; so accustomed, in fact, that we began pointing with our elbow even when we weren't playing drinking games. So a subculture--teenage male drinking 'societies'--develops its own awareness of the world.

The next move could be to the class level. Now, as a parent, I no longer engage in drinking games. Rather, I would encourage you to think of me as a thoroughly, righteous and upstanding member of the community. (Just kidding!) Anyway, I encourage my children not to rest their arms on the table when they eat. That's my middle-class upbringing shining through!

Korean drinking etiquette

Finally, we can move to a cultural level.  In Korea, if we can believe what I've heard, there is another experience of the right elbow. If you are pouring a drink for someone and wish to show respect, you can pour with your right hand and rest your right elbow lightly in your left palm.

Now following from Husserl, within a society we expect that the experience of the body is contingent on sociological factors such as class, age, even sports and hobbies. The experience is heightened when comparing cultures. The experience of the body therefore gives us great insight into cultures. This insight is not just cultures as sets of beliefs (e.g. the Ojibwe believed that bears are their grandfathers) but cultures as sets of experiences. 

Heidegger

Heidegger vs Husserl

Eclipsing Husserl in influence is Heidegger. Poor old Husserl is so easily overlooked, famous philosophy Professor Dreyfus said, in an unguarded moment, about phenomenology "Heidegger's the source...it all comes from him". Heidegger studied under Husserl, but he came to increasingly disavow his Jewish teacher. This seems to have occurred after Heidegger became a Nazi, something for which he never apologized or even seemed to regret! Regardless, some people place Heidegger, along with Wittgenstein, as the two greatest philosophers of the 20th Century.

Heidegger & Being-in-the-world

What Heidegger provides for me is a completely new way to understand my self. Before I read Heidegger I thought I was either (i) ethereal soul or spirit somehow trapped or connected to a physical body, or (ii) just a bunch of synapses and neurons, and entirely material entity. According to Heidegger, I am neither (i) nor (ii).

Heidegger refuses to split the world into thinking things and matter (i.e. subject and object). Rather, according to Heidegger, I am "da-sein" a being in the world. "Da-sein" is Heidegger's name for the self. The self is being along with other kinds of beings (headphones, remote controls, clouds, corn plants). )But da-sein is unique in that it knows about, cares about, and purposefully interacts with its fellow beings (I put headphones on my head, replace the batteries on my remote control, worry whether the cloud will bring rain, harvest my corn plant).

For more on Heidegger, you could start with my summary of Heidegger's "Being-in-the-world".

Merleau-Ponty

Merleau-Ponty & Embodiment

Merleau-Ponty's most important work was published in the 1940s. He was a French philosopher who put the final piece of the jigsaw together, for anthropologists at least. Husserl turned us on to experience; Heidegger places us in the world with other things. But where Heidegger seems largely to have overlooked to the body in the world, Merleau-Ponty stressed the role of the entire body interacting the world. In other words, Heidegger neglected the body; he treated the self ('da sein') as something like a head (replete with eyes, ears, taste buds etc.) interacting in the world. 

Merleau-Ponty drew on Husserl and Heidegger, but his idea was that perception is only possible if we take for granted that we possess a body in the world. So his philosophy starts with a body in the world, rather than (as with Descartes) a thought. Merleau-Ponty makes us aware that this body is replete with arms, legs, and adopts different positions (such as squatting, walking, riding a skateboard). Perception is always embodied, you cannot perceive without being a body in space. The form of your body (as a baby or an elderly person) and the position it takes (riding a motorbike or pushing a shopping trolley) constitutes your experience.

According to Merleau-Ponty the experience of walking on stilts, compared to walking or riding a bike, would
provide these 'Burning Man' revelers with a unique perspective of the world

To have senses is to have a body in space. That is what our subjectivity consists in. What it is to be you is to be a body in space. All your most precious experiences and also your most mundane actions and movements define who you are. But they all come through your having a body in space. This implies that changing your body (e.g. if you acquire a physical disability or a new physical ability) changes your perspective and changes who you are.

Reading Merleau-Ponty

For anthropology students who wish to develop an advanced understanding of phenomenology, of all three philosophers, I would suggest concentrating Merleau-Ponty. This is only because I think Merleau-Ponty has been more influential for anthropology. When it comes to studying, I usually think it is best to read the original author of an idea, rather than someone else explaining them. However, unluckily for us, Merleau-Ponty is très difficile to read. So we will read another philosopher Charles Taylor explaining Merleau-Ponty. Taylor is easier than Merleau-Ponty but is still challenging. So, take a big breath and read Taylor's "Embodied Agency". If you find it too much, my summary of Taylor might help.

Parkour enthusiasts experience, the stairs, concrete, bollards differently to a skateboarder. 

Philosophy and anthropology

And now a disclaimer. It feels strange to use so much Western philosophy in an anthropology course. Yet anthropologists have drawn much inspiration from philosophy in the study of body and mind. Maybe this is partly because questions of body and mind have troubled philosophers for generations, whereas body and mind has only emerged as a focus in anthropology since the 1980s. In any case, we anthropologists need a basic grasp of this philosophy, as it provides a theoretical basis for understanding body and mind in other cultures.

Required Reading: Kalpana Ram & Phantom Limbs

Now it's time to turn to an anthropological application of these ideas. Ram draws on the ideas of phenomenology to describe the experience of first Indian generation migrants in Australia's capital, Canberra.  They often live in a time-warp and create essentialized or reified versions of their ‘culture’ for their children. How is this embodied? You can read for yourself in:

Ram, K 2005, "Phantom limbs: South Indian dance and immigrant reifications of the female body", Journal of Intercultural Studies, v. 26, no. 1-2, pp. 121-137.

In the reading,  Ram describes the phenomenon of the 'phantom limb'. Philosophers have long pondered the question of the 'phantom limb'. Just say your arms and legs were amputated. After the surgery, your arms felt itchy and your legs felt painful. The 'phantom limb' refers to the frequently painful sensation that a missing arm or leg is still attached to the body.  It can occur in two situations; when a person was born without the limb, or when the limb was lost in an accident, amputation and so on. The 'phantom limb' troubles philosophers because it suggests that sensory data cannot be trusted. Ram, however, takes a different approach to the 'phantom limb'. She shows how it can be an analogy for the bodily experience of migration in two ways:

1. The phantom limb retains the position of the real limb at the time of injury—“the frozen quality of the “Indianness” that immigrants practice overseas” (e.g. they left India during the 1970s so Indians still wear flares in their imagination)
2. Phantom limb is created “in subjects who hitherto had none” in response to some circumstance or emotion—migration in colonial and post-colonial settings (e.g. they imagine a historical India that never existed)

For Indian migrants, in both cases, you feel something that is not actually there. The culture passed on to the second generation is replete with ‘phantom-like’ constructions.

Put simply, with phantoms limbs you feel that something which is there is real. Similarly, Indian migrants feel like something that isn't there is real. And this imagined (or ‘phantom’) culture becomes embodied.

Baseball Embodiment

Baseball players have a special way of moving.

Baseballers have unique ways of conducting their body. In this clip,
watch how, among many other things, the umpire signals "3" with his middle,
ring, and pinkie finger. 

Summary

Only a minority of anthropologists explicitly attempt to do phenomenological anthropology. Nevertheless, the concepts of "embodiment" and "lived experience" have come mainstays in contemporary anthropology. So, in Section 6, we will delve further into anthropological accounts of lived experience and embodiment.

 

4. Mind & Matter: Non-Human Persons

Welcome to Section 4 of "Culture, Body, and Mind", a course in the anthropology of body and mind.

Revision

In Section 1, we learned about the anthropological approach. In Sections 2 & 3, we applied that aspect of the anthropological approach which is known as 'reflexivity'. Specifically, in Section 2, we critically examined notions of self, including the Western idea of individual. Then, in Section 3, we looked at the foundational text which underlies contemporary Western ideas of body and mind; Descartes' meditations. In Section 4, we consider alternative ideas of body and mind.

Tylor's animism

E.B. Tylor

"Animism" is the belief in the existence of soul. Most people, following early anthropologist, Edward B Tylor, use the term animism to describe beliefs that rivers, streams, rocks, animals etc. have souls.  You can read more about this in my summary of a section from his Primitive Culture (1871). Tylor applied the term "animism" to describe what he perceived as 'primitive tribes'.

This raises problems for anthropologists. You might think the word "primitive" is not very "PC"--and indeed most anthropologists have problems with it for various reasons related to politics, racism etc. But even leaving that aside, we no longer find the word "primitive" useful in describing societies. The term "tribe" is used, but in very specific contexts (for example as a contrast to bands, chiefdoms, and civilizations).

Furthermore, as Tylor himself acknowledges, contemporary Westerners might be seen as animist. It seems to me that anyone (including, but certainly not limited to all pious Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, etc whom I have met) who believes they have a spirit or a soul would necessarily be animist, as defined by Tylor. Descartes, obviously, would be an animist, attributing spirit to humans and to God. But when Tylor was writing, many people believed that with 'march of progress', and the rise of science,  these irrational beliefs in spirit would become extinct in the West and then maybe the rest of the world. This is not a position that I, and indeed most anthropologists, hold.

Ojibwa territory

Essential reading: Ojibwa animism?

We now consider the work of Hallowell an anthropologist who studied among First Nations (American Indians) in, I think, the 1930s. His most famous work is an essay on the Ojibwa (aka Ojibwe). The Ojibwa a  First Nations people from the Great Lakes.  It is believed that they began migrating westwards (to the left in the above map) from eastern (right) Great Lakes area. Please read, and enjoy, "Ojibwa Ontology..."

Hallowell observes that, for the Ojibwa, certain animals, plants, rocks, streams, trees etc have a spirit. On one level we could say that the perspective of the Ojibwa, is thus called animism (the idea that objects can be animated with soul). At a deeper level, it is hard to see a clear distinction, as in Cartesian dualism, between subjects and objects. So that it's not as if objects as soul, but more that things like rocks and bear might not be objects at all. Rather, for the Ojibwa is a big category of persons: and we belong below this category, having equal status with other animals and rocks. Put simply, two kinds of person exist: human and non-human. Instead of the dualism Descartes perceived in the universe, for the Ojibwa there is a oneness. What concept might we draw on to explain this difference?

Ojibwa family

Ojibwa ontology

If you find reading the original Hallowell difficult, you could also look at my summary In my summary I focus on the concept of ontology:

The word "ontology" means "your theory on what exists". So, if you believe in aliens and ghosts, then aliens and ghosts are part of your ontology. Descartes, a Western philosopher said that there was only mind and matter in the universe. Thus, his ontology held that there is only two radically distinct things, also known as "subject" (mind) and "object" (matter). And for a long while many Westerners adopted this ontology. Ojibwa ontology includes that persons take human and non-human form. This contradicts  Descartes' distinction of subject and object. It also means that humans, animals, trees, rocks, etc. are merely a sub-category of the larger category of persons 

Ojibwa family

Analyzing Ojibwa world-view

If we take a non-anthropological Western perspective we could say "oh Ojibwa have got it wrong. They don't understand that plants don't have souls". Or more likely, "wow the Ojibwa are so spiritual, they believe that a plant has soul!". By contrast, from the anthropological perspective, we say: "Let's say they've got it right. What would that mean?" 

Summary

By considering Aboriginal (Indigenous) Australians (Sections 2 & 3), and the Ojibwa (Section 4) we have been exposed to different conceptions of self, body, and mind. This could encourage reflection and introspection for us anthropologists. Even Western philosophers cannot agree on Western ideas of body and mind so it would seem incumbent upon us, if only as anthropologists, to seriously consider the possibility that we are not who or what we think we are. So what's the take-away point? Basically: Anthropology has shown that the idea of what constitutes self varies between culture. We can get this from such accounts as:

• Stanner on The Dreaming; 
• Tylor's on animism;  and, 
• Hallowell's on Ojibwe ontology,

all demonstrate that Descartes' theory is a culturally specific understanding of personhood. In a similar way, "Another way the cultural specificity of Cartesian Dualism shows up is with regard to "The Dreaming"

Speaking frankly, when I reflect on the materials we've covered in Sections 1-4, my own ideas about body and mind start to seem a little strange and those of the Ojibwa and other cultural groups seem more familiar. Indeed, this is a common experience for anthropologists. We find that studying anthropology makes the familiar strange and the strange familiar.